Проект "НИТИ" Нити Центральной Азии
CENTRAL ASIA AND NEIGHBORS (Part 1)
MIGRATION IN THE REGION
The position of Central Asia is unique. It is an important region (and in certain issues the key region for the continent), which is an arena for a conflict of interests of the largest geopolitical forces in the world. Judge for yourself.
— The Chinese and European* industries depend on supplies of minerals from Central Asia.
— The specific customs regime formed in Central Asia creates one of the largest gray import zones in the world.
— Central Asia forms the largest migration corridor, comparable to the human flows to the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Western Europe.
* Now, due to the military actions in Ukraine, the importance of the region for the EU has increased even more.
…on the other hand, the Central Asian states are almost completely deprived of their independence in making key decisions for the lives of their citizens.
All the countries of the region seem to be connected by thousands of unseen threads. Often these interactions are completely invisible and even incomprehensible. These threads cannot be seen (at least by ordinary citizens), nor can they be ignored.
All the countries of the region seem to be connected by thousands of unseen threads. Often these interactions are completely invisible and even incomprehensible. These threads cannot be seen (at least by ordinary citizens), nor can they be ignored.
By ignoring them, regional governments risk being hit by economic crises, revolutions, sanctions and customs wars with major authoritarian neighbors. How does this work? What are the relations that affect the geopolitics of Central Asia?
«THREADS» PROJECT is an analytical project about how processes in one country in Central Asia affect the other countries of the region.
ISSUE THEME:
Labor Migration
The important part of the project is also to comprehend how these processes affect the lives of ordinary people.
LABOR MIGRATION
«WHERE WERE YOU?»
Zhyldyz, a 37-year-old woman from Bishkek, worked in Russia for many years. She made the decision to leave in 2007, when she was studying in her fourth year at the Academy of Tourism — her father was out of work, her younger sisters went to university, and the family had no money.
Until then, she had not considered Russia as a country in which to make money, but she had no other people she knew who could help her get settled. In Moscow, a classmate turned out to be such a person.
The young woman planned to make more money and open a cafe in Bishkek. But plans changed over time.
— I took the train, like all migrants. The journey was long, full of different stories. There were ‘hares’ among us — stowaways,» recalls Zhyldyz. — There was no fear. I only realized the situation when the train arrived at the Kazanskiy railway station and they began to announce: «Get ready, detraining soon». I then thought: «And if my friend won’t come, where will I go?» I was going at my own risk. I was probably too young and energetic at that moment.
Zhyldyz was lucky. Her friend arrived. Two days later the young woman found her first job, which was extraordinary, because many migrants without proper documents couldn’t find a job for a long time. She needed a bit of cunning and trickiness.
— Everyone was surprised: «we can’t get a job without documents for so many days». I immediately sat down at the computer and started looking for work through an Internet search engine. And I did. It was a cafe in another part of the city, the owners were Armenians, and I got a job as a waitress. At that time, I needed a work permit, I didn’t have one, but I went and lied to them that I was already doing [the permit] and it was almost ready, they could hire me. I guess they saw my confidence and took me on right away. I worked from 10 a.m. to 8 p.m. there. We worked in shifts, we managed to make it to the closing of the subway. I didn’t work there very long, about a month, and then I found a job where I worked twenty-four hours on, twenty-four hours off, and the pay was twice as much there. I worked there as a barmaid. The owners were also Armenians, they had two buildings — one was a restaurant, the other was a sports bar. People came to watch soccer, it was an easy crowd.
A month later, the young woman found a part-time job as a marker in a billiard hall. There was almost no time for rest. Zhyldyz lived like this for six months. This is not uncommon among migrants.
— Our women work not just at one place, but at several places. Where I worked, we had a cleaner — she worked at the theater in the morning, at our place in the afternoon, and part-time somewhere else in the evening.
Over these ten years Zhyldyz has been in different roles and companies. The sphere of activity from catering changed after a lucky acquaintance with a woman who invited her to work as a dispatcher. Since then, the range of available vacancies has grown — the young woman has worked as a manager, SMM-specialist, launched a diaspora newspaper with advertisements.
— I didn’t even look for work in Kyrgyzstan, because after the salaries in Moscow I don’t want to work for small wages,» the woman says.
All these ten years the young woman periodically returned to Kyrgyzstan, where she got married and had five children. Next time she went to Russia to work with her husband. Zhyldyz says she is 80% satisfied with her decision to go to Russia to earn money. 20% is guilt about the children, whom she and her husband left for two years.
— When my husband and I left, our children were 3 and 2 years old. Now they are teenagers, and I can already feel the problems. The older daughter sometimes says, «You were gone, you dumped us. Where were you?». It’s better now, but I know from my friends that they have difficult relationships with their children. We are not the first flow of migrants — I think the second, the first flow are the children of migrants who have already married, and they also have problems, I read stories in various social networks that parents and children have become complete strangers to each other. It’s really a problem. And how many children are left without their parents now? You don’t see it now. Only 17 years have passed, and I’ve learned the lessons of what we did wrong.
Seven years ago Zhyldyz finally returned to Kyrgyzstan. It was because of her father’s illness. The woman has no regrets about her return. Together with her husband, Zhyldyz opened a children’s products store, which already has five branches.
— In the beginning it was difficult. Two years later, after we came back, we started looking for new ways, and since then there is no thought of going back at all.
Migrants in Kyrgyzstan are a significant force (including financial) capable of changing the lives of certain regions of Kyrgyzstan for the better. But they clearly need a regulating factor in the form of friendly state structures capable of uniting and directing people’s initiatives. At the same time, migration, with all its financial benefits, is a kind of cultural and generational shock for all the residents of Kyrgyzstan involved in its processes.
LABOR MIGRATION
ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE
Labor migration from the countries of Central Asia represents one of the largest migration corridors in the world. The Russian Federation is a global center of attraction for migrants, along with Western Europe, Saudi Arabia and the United States.
Before the 2020 crisis, 15-16 million foreign citizens visited the Russian Federation annually. At least 30% of them arrived in the country for the purpose of employment.
This has created a peculiar and extremely significant for Central Asian countries factor of dependence on remittances from migrants. Thus, for Kyrgyzstan migrant remittances are more significant than the entire state budget and provide over 30% of GDP. Remittances from the Russian Federation are also significant for other countries in the region.
Central Asian countries are the main suppliers of labor migrants to Russia. Most of them come from Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. Experts cite high unemployment and low wages as reasons for labor migration.
Statistical committees and institutions of Russia and countries of origin give different information about the number of migrant workers.
Thus, according to the Ministry of Employment and Labor Relations of Uzbekistan, in 2021 the number of Uzbek labor migrants in Russia was 1,036,305 people, and according to the Russian Statistics Service, in 2021 there were 4,519,618 residents of Uzbekistan on the migration register.
After the creation of the EAEU, the number of migrants registered with Russian migration authorities arriving to work doubled. It is worth noting that a huge role here was played not so much by the EAEU countries, for which benefits came into effect (EAEU citizens can work without a patent, and possible periods of stay have been increased), as by Uzbekistan, which is not an EAEU member, the number of migrants from which has increased by more than 3 million since 2016.
As noted by experts, the difference can be explained by counting the same people several times — they can arrive and leave during the year.
Despite the fact that Uzbekistan has not joined the EAEU, Russia and Uzbekistan are concluding mutual agreements «on migration rules,» which increases the period of stay without registration to 15 days (the usual period is 7 days).
Uzbekistan has managed to achieve significant success in the exchange of migrant workers without being part of the EAEU. It is worth noting that ten years ago the Uzbek government declared its intention to completely eliminate dependence on migrant money. To this end, Uzbekistan planned to achieve a significant increase in GDP per capita.
The government of Uzbekistan aims to create a development program called «Strategy for Structural Transformation and Economic Development of Uzbekistan until 2030» (Strategy-2030). Under this strategy, it is planned to accelerate economic growth and increase gross national income per capita from $1,700 in 2012 to at least $4,000 in 2030, i.e., to the upper segment of the group of middle-income countries. Achieving the goals of Strategy-2030 is directly dependent on the creation of good working places for the citizens of Uzbekistan. This strategy aims to eradicate poverty and expand the middle class.
Today we can state that the government of Uzbekistan has not only completely abandoned these plans, but has turned the migration exchange with Russia into a global, constantly evolving business project.
According to the Russian Statistics Service, 9,530,934 people came to Russia for employment purposes in 2021, 84% of them were from Central Asian countries. Most labor migrants came from Uzbekistan — 4,519,618, Tajikistan — 2,439,198 and Kyrgyzstan — 884,133. From Kazakhstan 163,938 people moved in.
According to the World Bank’s data for 2021 (Migration and Development Report), Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are among the top five countries with the largest share of remittances from migrants into the country.
The first on the list is Lebanon, the second is Togo, the third is Tajikistan, and the fourth is Kyrgyzstan.
The share of migrants’ remittances as a share of GDP in Kyrgyzstan has not fallen below 25.3 percent over 12 years, and on average, remittances amounted to 29 percent of GDP over 12 years. The highest share of remittances from GDP in Kyrgyzstan came in 2021 — when, with GDP of $8.5 billion, migrants transferred $2.7 billion to the country. The lowest share was in 2015 — with GDP of $6.6 billion, migrants transferred $1.6 billion. At that time, amid the currency crisis in Russia, the volume of remittances in Kyrgyzstan decreased by 25%, in Tajikistan — by 33%, and in Uzbekistan — by 48%.
Between 2009 and 2019, migrants transferred $19 billion into the country, more than the volume of exports. 82% of these remittances come from Russia.
*The World Bank notes that data on the share of remittances from Russia for different countries are taken from data of the Central Bank of Russia, which in the case of the Kyrgyz Republic shows 82%, which is higher than the share of 71% reported by the National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic.
In general, we can state that the migration flows of Central Asia until 2022 ended with the economic structures of the Russian Federation, forming a strong financial dependence on its northern neighbor. The EAEU agreements (according to the original plan) were supposed to be the mechanism that would provide Russia with a constant inflow of labor force. This worked well in the case of Kyrgyzstan.
In Tajikistan, the share of remittances as a share of GDP in 2021, according to the World Bank, was 33.4%. Over 20 years, the maximum level of the share of remittances was in 2008 — 44.1 % of GDP, in 2009 it decreased sharply, and in 2011-2013 it almost returned to its previous level. After 2013, there was a steady decline to 26.7-29.7 %.
In dollar terms, the residents of Tajikistan made the maximum number of transfers in 2013 — $3.7 billion, in 2021 this amount was $2.92 billion.
The amount of transfers is much higher than the amount the state receives for all annual exports of goods and services. In 2021, it amounted to 204.8% of exports.
The share of remittances from Russia according to the World Bank is 58%, according to the Central Bank of Russia — 61.4%.
Most remittances per person are in Kyrgyzstan — $416 and in Tajikistan — $299.
Uzbekistan, despite its high rates of labor migration and remittances from them, is not in the cohort of countries where remittances represent a significant share of GDP. This is due to a significant difference in GDP size. While Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan’s GDP (2021) is $8.5 billion and $8.7 billion, respectively, Uzbekistan’s GDP is $69.2 billion.
«With high unemployment and large state budget deficits, these (Central Asian) countries cannot afford to increase public spending to support domestic demand and are heavily dependent on foreign remittances,» as World Bank analysts point out in the Migration and Development Report.
The high figures indicate dependence on the recipient country. In the case of Central Asian-Russian migration interactions, when relations cool down, Russia (which, in fact, itself needs the labor force in the form of migrant workers) has additional levers of pressure.
Migrants in Kyrgyzstan, for example, earn so much compared to the country’s annual budget (by the way, Kyrgyzstan’s annual budget is less than the volume of remittances) that the state sees migrants as an additional source of investment.
From time to time, returning migrant workers build houses for the poor and bridges. Migrants’ money in 2019 also began to work for the development of the country’s infrastructure — the government asked migrant workers to transfer money to specially created development funds. About a million dollars was transferred to one of these funds. This money was used to build five kindergartens, six sports centers, and to pave four kilometers of road with asphalt.
According to the International Labor Organization in 2018, there are 164 million migrant workers worldwide, 58 % of them are men. Often migrant workers or human rights organizations declare regular violations of their rights. The most frequent case of violation of rights is work without an employment contract. In this case, the employer can fire the employee without paying wages.
In some cases, we can assume a negative impact of labor migration on internal processes in Central Asian countries. Compare these two graphs.
While the number of school graduates remains practically unchanged, fewer and fewer young people in Kyrgyzstan get higher education every year.
The drop is quite significant — from 52,000 in 2016 to 35,000 in 2021. The number of high school graduates, on the contrary, is growing from 90,000 to 98,000 over the same period. In other words, there is an obvious trend towards reducing the number of young people with higher education, as they are not in demand on the labor markets in the Russian Federation.
Officials offer their own explanations for what is happening. In their view, the problem is rather that the domestic labor market in Kyrgyzstan lacks workplaces for people with higher education.
«There are about 230 thousand students in our universities, 93 thousand in the system of secondary vocational education, and from 32 to 35 thousand in the system of primary vocational education. Many people with higher education are not in demand in the labor market. They come to short-term courses to retrain in other professions — to become cooks, hairdressers, and so on.
Gulnur Mamyrova
Head of the Primary Vocational Education and Training Department of the Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan
This explanation also deserves attention. But, as we remember, during the period under study (from 2016 to 2021) the number of labor migrants from Kyrgyzstan to Russia increased from 300,000 to 800,000, which means that this growth is a factor that we cannot ignore.
INTERMEDIATE CONCLUSION
One of the world’s largest migration corridors has been formed in Central Asia, which is closed to the Russian Federation. The EAEU agreements play a significant role in facilitating the paperwork and transit of migrant workers from EAEU member countries. Central Asian countries that are not part of the EAEU also conclude agreements with Russia that make it easier for their citizens to cross borders and find work. For three of the five Central Asian countries, labor migration is a significant factor in replenishing state budgets. Labor migration noticeably affects the domestic politics of Central Asian countries. In some countries of the region several generations of workers have grown up who are oriented economically exclusively to serving the economy of the former metropolis.
The material was prepared by the Project «THREADS» team consisting of Khadisha Akayeva, Bolot Satarkulov, Ilya Barokhovsky, Adil Turdukulov, Galym Ageleuov.
