But even without it, «the great transmigration of people» (as a process caused by the conscious policy of the government of the Russian Federation) would have taken place … albeit many times slower, during not individual years but entire decades.
What are the consequences of migration processes in the expanses of Central Asia in 2022? What is the future of the region?
*Since 1985, when the RSFSR ceased to be a source of a large number of specialists for the union republics.
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ILYA KUZNETSOVanti-war migrant— Nothing was known about mobilization yet, just the very fact of the outbreak of the war greatly cut the ground from under the feet, it was completely not clear what to do, it was not believed that the war could begin. Literally on the second or third day, a quite tough military censorship machine began to deploy. I tried to speak publicly wherever I could, I tried to participate in political activities, I helped the anti-corruption foundation [a non-profit foundation created by Russian political prisoner Alexei Navalny] and it seemed that it was impossible to stay and continue doing what I was doing, because it was simply not safe.
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ILYA KUZNETSOVanti-war migrant— It travels about 20 hours; I was already ready for it. But they did not take me – back then, after COVID, the land borders with Kazakhstan were closed, and it was possible to transit only with a Kyrgyz passport, but it was impossible with a Russian one,» says Ilya. — In the first days of the war, flights began to be canceled one after another. I bought tickets from Irkutsk direct to where they were — they were canceled, I bought new ones — they were canceled again. At some point, I already thought that, probably, I would not be able to fly away, I was ready to buy some old Niva and go by land to Mongolia, because I thought that was all. But in the end, one flight Irkutsk — Osh appeared, it was not canceled, and I flew to Osh on it.
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ILYA KUZNETSOVanti-war migrant— When we arrived, there was a feeling of freedom, there was a feeling that you could exhale in safety in a place where you could live and talk.
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ILYA KUZNETSOVanti-war migrant— At first, I got a little stuck, I thought that it was good, cozy, cool here, it is possible to stay here not for two weeks but for a month or two. In two months, acquaintances, some projects, business began to be made, and we have been here for more than a year, — says Ilya Kuznetsov. – We advertised Bishkek very strongly when we arrived, and this advertisement worked. We even have our own telegram chat – «Irkutsk people in Bishkek», there are about thirty people there. These are exactly those to whom we strongly advertised Bishkek, — says Ilya. — And as soon as we arrived, we made a chat «Welcome to Kyrgyzstan», there are about 20 thousand people now.
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ILYA KUZNETSOVanti-war migrant— In the beginning, there were no problems with housing — we rented an apartment at a fairly good price, at that time the prices had not risen yet. Now there are much more difficulties with housing, prices have risen a lot. Like one and a half times.
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ILYA KUZNETSOVanti-war migrant— When the mobilization began, there were a lot of difficulties, people did not have enough housing. Friends who had some establishments let people to spend the night at their place. We had a two-room apartment with a bedroom, a kitchen and an office, and we also placed five people on the sofa and on the floor in the office, they lived with us for some time while they were looking for housing. At that time, it was difficult, then some people lived in incomprehensible conditions somewhere in the basements of houses and somewhere else, they rented small apartments together with a large number of people. It was everywhere, but it did not last long — probably a month. Then it went downhill, I do not hear such stories anymore, although it is still popular to rent a big house or a big apartment and live in families or alone. Local people helped a lot, and indignation — even those who helped were indignant, but this is completely understandable. But there was a lot of help.
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ILYA KUZNETSOVanti-war migrant— The first wave — those who have already lived here for a year, there is a feeling that they are already local, participating in some activities — I hope that I can no longer be distinguished from the local «Orus». I try to learn basic phrases in Kyrgyz.
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ILYA KUZNETSOVanti-war migrant«Most of them stayed, but I know that they all have problems with work, earnings; they live in acceptable but not very good conditions for their savings, and they have not been able to earn some kind of income for more than a year,» says Kuznetsov. — Now I already seem to get more money than from freelancing, and I saw that there are more or less active people who get some kind of a part-time job. For example, I teach at Compass College and almost a third of the teaching staff are just arrived specialists. Now many Russians work in the field of hospitality, in bars, as couriers. In general, there is work, but, of course, not always highly paid.
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ILYA KUZNETSOVanti-war migrant«Six months later, with tears and pain, I seemed to admit to myself that there was little chance of ever returning,» says Ilya. – I am going to stay here for the next 2-3 years. What happens next is not entirely clear. I thought to stay here completely, now I have doubts because of the decrease in stability, the possibility of drastic changes. I really did not like to suddenly leave Russia; I really do not want to tie myself to a country where these risks also exist.
for Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan was about 70% (of the total volume of transfers), then in 2022 this portion increased by 7% and 11%, respectively.
Experts note that the volume of transfers to countries clearly correlates with GDP of Russia. That is, the fall in GDP, the economic crisis will largely affect the countries of our region.
However, this assessment is not something new. Something else is much more important.
In 2022, in addition to the traditional processes associated with the migration exchange between Russia and Central Asia, the region, in an unusually acute form, faced processes that either had not previously existed or had existed in a much milder form:
— mass emigration** (which some publicists aptly called «anti-war»);
– a multimillion influx of refugees*** from the war-torn territories of Ukraine;
The countries of Central Asia, in turn, had to cope with the influx of millions of highly skilled migrants from Russia.
Being interconnected, these processes have significantly affected all **** actors in the region and are now leading to completely unexpected (from the point of view of ordinary citizens) consequences.
*Excluding Turkmenistan.
**Influenced both Russia and Central Asia equally from all perspectives.
** Influenced Russia in the short term, but in the long term it entails significant consequences for the Central Asian region as well, as it affects the labor markets of the Russian Federation.
****Excluding Turkmenistan. 😉
About 8,000 non-residents received an individual identification number (IIN), which allows them to conduct a business and business transactions in 2022.
The migration of Russians to Kazakhstan and their subsequent movement to other countries spurred many sectors of the economy of the Republic*.
Many Russian IT companies have completely or partially transferred their business to Kazakhstan**.
At the moment, we can control the changes only by indirect signs (for example, during 2022, Astana Hub, the largest international technopark of IT startups in Central Asia, grew sharply and unexpectedly).
*The issue of creating joint companies with the participation of Russians and changing the face of trade in the region is indirectly related to migration, but still relates primarily to international trade and will be considered by us in a separate article.
**Partly this may be due to an attempt to avoid sanctions.
The reaction is different. Some are very happy with the newly opened possibilities of freedom (you can open your favorite websites, social networks without VPN, you can use and pay with cards); others enjoy the weather, an abundance of fruits and vegetables; others compare prices and other amenities for living with major Russian cities and generally come to the conclusion that it is not all bad. Of course, Uzbekistan cannot provide the same level of comfort as many cities in Russia, in terms of Internet speed, accessibility of public transport and other things yet. In general, our cities are not focused on the needs of residents, and this is a big problem. But we will be glad to look at all this «disgrace» through their eyes, since much of it is already familiar to us, and we do not even notice. But thanks to their observations, many simple things can be fixed without spending much time and resources»
On the other hand, the current situation has opened up a number of new opportunities for entire industries. The wave of highly skilled migrants has created points of growth, which Uzbekistan has not failed to take advantage of this, moreover, consciously and strategically thoughtfully.
Among the practical measures that directly have influenced the influx of highly qualified specialists, one can list the complete exemption for migrants from all corporate taxes, the reduction of personal income tax from 12% to 7.5%, and the simplification of procedures for registering a business and hiring foreign experts.
Government policy has led to a tangible growth in the IT sector of Uzbekistan. The export of services from Uzbekistan in 2022 not only recovered (compared to the period before the pandemic) but also showed a significant increase.
We acted reactively and fully relied on the requests of the relocating migrants themselves.»
As part of the relocation process, in 2022, 68 foreign IT companies became residents of Uzbekistan.
In the long term, the migration of specialists from the Russian Federation may become one of the main drivers of national economic growth*.
* It is worth considering that the events of 2023, in particular the preparation of conditions for a large mobilization, significantly increase the motivation for anti-war migrants. It is possible that in the near future we will see new waves of migration to the countries of Central Asia.
The status of «Digital nomad» provides for:
— exemption from the obligation to register at the place of residence in the territory of the Kyrgyz Republic;
— exemption from the need to obtain a work permit;
— automatic receipt of a personal identification number (PIN);
— work permit up to 12 months with the possibility of extension up to one year;
— the right to carry out individual entrepreneurial activities or activities as a legal entity;
— the right to initiate the registration of a legal entity;
— the right to open and use bank accounts in the Kyrgyz Republic without mandatory registration at the place of residence.
From September 29, 2022 to February 2023, 2799 applications were submitted for Digital Nomad status. 1490 of these applications were approved. According to the interview with Ilya Kuznetsov, the total number of migrants from Russia is dozens of times higher than these figures. Obviously, not all migrants from the Russian Federation can or want to claim the status of «Digital Nomads».
Kyrgyz experts also note that migrants have affected entire industries. Hotel owners and property owners benefited from the arrival of foreigners: rental prices in Bishkek, Osh and other cities immediately rose sharply. The banking sector also acts as a beneficiary: commissions for banking services for foreign citizens were raised here.
— Bishkek is a rather comfortable space for Russian-speaking specialists.
— The government of Kyrgyzstan made a conscious effort to retain the most skilled migrants in the Kyrgyz economy.
— The total volume of the economy of Kyrgyzstan is not very large (compared to neighboring Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan) and does not provide enough investment for the implementation of large projects.
Today, the statistical authorities of Kyrgyzstan do not provide accurate information to assess the consequences for the economy of the Republic. We will make a more accurate assessment at the end of 2023.
And it should be explained by some imperceptible at first glance but important factors.
For example, the simplification of the acquisition of citizenship for those foreign citizens who enter into contracts for military service in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation or military formations for a period of one year.
However, this factor (quite interesting in itself) still could not change the overall picture so significantly with an increase in the number of those who took Russian citizenship, because this decision came into force only in the last quarter of 2022.
In our previous reviews , we have already pointed out that the Russian Federation forms one of the largest migration corridors in the world. Every year the number of entries from Central Asia to the Russian Federation grows.
However, the statistics of temporary labor migration and the statistics of citizenship acquisition do not always directly correlate with each other. Depending on the economic and political situation, the governments of countries receiving migrants can both consciously put up barriers in order to deter temporary labor migrants from acquiring citizenship, and vice versa – to facilitate its admission.
The corresponding document has been approved by the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection of the Russian Federation.
The list of professions includes builders, medical workers, farmers, teachers, journalists, engineers and many others. In total, the list includes 203 specialties in 14 sections.»
10:22 15.06.2023
We can assume that one of the motives for facilitating the acquisition of Russian citizenship in 2022-2023 was the loss of a large number of citizens who went abroad in connection with the rejection of hostilities.
By increasing the flow of labor migrants, the government of the Russian Federation at the same time creates more and more favorable conditions for the largest possible proportion of these migrants to become citizens of the Russian Federation.
the number of migrants needed by Russia. To keep the population at the same level, the Russian Federation needs to attract from 390 000 to 1,1 million* migrants a year.
The corresponding study has been prepared by scientists from the Institute of Demography named after A.G. Vishnevsky of the National Research University Higher School of Economics, Valery Yumaguzin and Maria Vinnik.
According to demographers, depending on various scenarios of fertility and mortality, the level of migration growth in 2021–2023 should have been (to stabilize the population at the previous level) from 460 000 to 1 200 000 people.
* Depending on the number of births, where both optimistic and pessimistic forecasts are given.
From 2002 to 2014, employers’ mandatory pension contributions had been divided into parts. Since 2010, 16% of each employee’s salary had gone to the budget of the Pension Fund of Russia (PFR), and then had gone to payments to current pensioners. 6% had been transferred to a person’s individual retirement account.
By 2014, the gap between employers’ contributions and pension payments was too wide. There were more and more pensioners, and the number of working citizens had been slowly but constantly increasing.
The Government of the Russian Federation had officially decided to transfer all pension contributions to the PFR for payments to pensioners. It can be said that from that moment the pension system of the Russian Federation returned to the system of solidarity payments, when the younger generation pays a pension (with its contributions) to the older one.
* The payment of pensions to the elderly is carried out at the expense of contributions from the current working people.
**The payment of pensions is carried out at the expense of funds accumulated by a pensioner during his/her life and investment income, interest accrued in the course of investing this capital.
However, from 2019 to 2022, the number of pensioners registered in the system of the Pension Fund of Russia had been declining (by 0,7% in 2019, 1,3% in 2020, 2,3% in 2021, 0,6% for 2022).
An increase in the retirement age leads to the fact that some of the relatively young people of pre-retirement age retire much later, while older age cohorts (those who have retired a long time ago) rapidly decline due to natural mortality.
Starting from 2019, the Russian government gradually increased the retirement age in order to reduce the number of pension recipients, i.e. to reduce the burden on the pension system of Russia. According to the results of the first year of the reform — 2019 — according to Rosstat, the number of pensioners was reduced by 319 000 people, in 2020 — by 569 000*. In 2021, the process accelerated: in the first quarter, the country lost 379 000 pensioners, in the second – 243 000, in the third – 145 000, in the fourth – 204 000. In total, the country lost 971 000 pensioners in 2021.
*The COVID epidemic has also played a role.
However, this approach has its limitations. It is impossible to raise the retirement age indefinitely (the resources of this approach are almost exhausted).
The sharp increase in the acceptance of new citizenships of the Russian Federation by the inhabitants of Central Asia is the result of a conscious policy of the Russian government.
At the same time, despite the rather thoughtful interaction with the governments of the Central Asian countries, the government of the Russian Federation extremely illogically shot itself in the foot, causing multimillion waves of anti-war migration.
Undoubtedly, the population decline creates other challenges for the Russian government (a decrease in the number of taxpayers, a decrease in the mobilization resource, etc.). However, it is precisely that problem with pension contributions is the problem of today, i.e. the problem that cannot simply be left to the future, the problem that will be noticed by large groups of the population (pensioners and people of pre-retirement age), and it will lead to a sharp explosion of social discontent.
Obviously, in order to solve this problem, the Russian government will have to continue to create new conditions every year to attract new citizens from Central Asia or other regions.
The only alternative to the rapid collapse of the pension system of the Russian Federation in this case is the constant «import» of new citizens who pay pension contributions to previous generations of Russians. The policy of importing «ordinary» labor migrants no longer works in this case.